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INTRODUCTION
It is worthy of note when someone of the jurisprudential
stature of Richard Posner elaborately articulates from the
bench a distinctive approach to a fundamental question in
an area as crucial as freedom of speech. It is therefore not
without some justification that this Essay focuses on the con-
curring opinion of Judge Posner in the recent case of Miller
v. Civil City of South Bend, l a case that Judge Posner himself
refers to as "fascinating."2
In Miller the en banc Seventh Circuit divided seven to four
on the constitutional issues presented. The various opin-
ions spanned approximately fifty-three pages of the Federal
Reporter. The occasion for these extended constitutional
disquisitions was the not obviously monumental jurispru-
dential question of whether a particular Indiana public inde-
cency statute3 could be constitutionally applied to prohibit
nonobscene barroom commercial nude dancing. The court
majority, with which Judge Posner concurred, held that the
statute as applied was unconstitutional 4 on the grounds that
such an application amounted to an unjustified 5 interference
with the plaintiffs'6 exercise of their free speech rights. 7
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 11l S. Ct. 38 (1990). For an expression of generalized lack of intellectual sym-
pathy for the majority opinion and the concurring opinion of Judge Posner in Miller,
see Walker v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, 911 F.2d 80, 85-90 (8th Cir. 1990) (per
Bowman, J., with Dunbauld, J., concurring on other grounds) (dicta). But cf. id at 98,
99 n.6 (Lay, J., dissenting) (dicta) (expressing greater sympathy with the majority in
Miller and with the relativist and subjectivist elements of Judge Posner's concurring
opinion in Miller).
2 Miller, 904 F.2d at 1090 (Posner, J., concurring).
3 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Burns 1985).
4 Miller, 904 F.2d at 1089.
5 See id. at 1088.
6 The plaintiffs included three women who were professionally engaged as bar-
room nude dancers, as well as two nude dancing establishments, only one of which
was regulable as serving alcoholic beverages. See id. at 1082. For discussion of the
constitutional relevance in this general context of the twenty-first amendment, see
New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981)(per curiam).
7 See Miller, 904 F.2d at 1085.
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Judge Posner's concurring opinion, which is remarkable
for its breadth and depth of learning, focuses not so much
on the logically secondary issue of whether the state's bur-
dening of the plaintiffs' speech could be constitutionally jus-
tified, but on the logically prior issue of whether the
plaintiffs' activities could be classified as involving "speech"
within the meaning of the first amendment.8 Judge Posner
concluded that the plaintiffs' activities did in fact fall within
the scope or ambit of coverage of the free speech clause,9
based on a broadranging argument, which is considered be-
low. For the sake of background and perspective, though, it
may be useful to first consider more generally how ques-
tions involving the scope of the free speech clause may best
be approached.
I. A VALUES-BASED APPROACH TO THE SPEECH/NON-
SPEECH DISTINCTION
The question of whether commercial barroom nude danc-
ing, or anything else, counts as "speech" in the constitu-
tional sense could be approached in various ways. It is
conceivable, for example, that one might wish to ask
whether most of the drafters and ratifiers of the first amend-
ment entertained some reasonably reconstructible general
intent in the matter, especially where the literal text of the
first amendment would not seem to suggest the inclusion of
most commercial nude dancing. Such an approach is, how-
ever, something of a nonstarter, at least in mainstream con-
temporary jurisprudential thinking.
This is not because the relevant original intent is nonexis-
tent, equivocal, or unascertainable, but because for one rea-
son or another we simply do not collectively care sufficiently
about original intent to grant it decisive weight in determin-
ing contemporary jurisprudential issues.Io Judge Posner is
hardly alone in assuming that a concern for original intent
in this context implies a preference for a "petrified" over a
"living" Constitution." This position is to some extent
something of a red herring, in that no serious originalist ap-
proach is inclined to ignore new and unanticipated sorts of
8 See id. at 1089-1104 (Posner, J., concurring).
9 See id. at 1092 (Posner, J., concurring).
10 See id. at 1095-96 (Posner, J., concurring).
I I See id. (Posner, J., concurring).
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threats to at least the established values underlying the con-
stitutional provision in question.' 2 Regardless, originalism
currently lacks sufficiently broad-based credibility to merit a
full exposition here.
On the other hand, a values-based approach to the free
speech clause, under which no controlling weight is neces-
sarily assigned to the values of the constitutional framers or
ratifiers, seems more attuned to the main currents of con-
temporary jurisprudence. We shall also assume that there is
little point at this historical juncture in arguing that the val-
ues underlying the free speech clause should be confined to
a distinctively political sort.13
Among the most obvious candidates for the broad range
of values, purposes, or aims that might distinctively underlie
and inform free speech jurisprudence and delimit its scope
are the promotion of the societal search for truth, meaning-
ful participation in the democratic process of self-govern-
ment, and individual self-fulfillment or self-realization.1 4 It
would be foolish for judges to decide issues involving the
scope of the free speech clause simply by direct recourse to
this or any other list of values without regard for established
case law. Ultimately, though, the purposes or values
12 See, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc)(Bork,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). In Oilman Judge Bork argued that
originalism counsels that "it is the task of the judge in this generation to discern how
the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the world
we know. The world changes in which unchanging values find their application." Id.
at 995 (Bork, J., concurring). More specifically, Judge Bork concluded that "[t]he
first amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press was written by men who had not
the remotest idea of modern forms of communication. But that does not make it
wrong for a judge to find the values of the first amendment relevant to radio and
television broadcasting." Id. at 996 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork's approach to
Miller would thus initially involve consideration of whether the protection or legiti-
mate furtherance of the values underlying the free speech clause, actually held by the
framers themselves, require recognizing ordinary commercial barroom nude dancing
as speech in the constitutional sense. Perhaps the real difference between Judges
Bork and Posner in this regard focuses on the extent, if any, to which it is legitimate
for a judge to depart from the values, at some particular level of generality, of the
framers, to the extent those values are reasonably unequivocal and ascertainable.
For an assessment by Judge Posner of Robert Bork's approach to judicial interpreta-
tion, see Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990).
13 For a cogent and salutary extended exposition of the importance of the distinc-
tively political in the context of the free speech clause, see Logan, Tort Law and the
Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. PITr. L. REV. 493 (1990).
14 See, e.g., Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189, 193 (1983). See generally R.G. WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAW 1-31
(1990).
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thought to distinctively underlie the free speech clause serve
as a touchstone. If those values, properly understood, are
not significantly implicated in a particular case or kind of
case, then the reasons for distinctively constitutionally pro-
tecting speech are not present. It would seem most sensible
in such cases to decline to find the activity at issue to consti-
tute speech in the constitutional sense.
Of course, even if all this is granted, controversy remains.
To illustrate both the general application of a values-based
approach to the scope of speech in the constitutional sense
and its ineliminable potential for controversy, we might con-
sider the recent Ninth Circuit case of Duran v. City of Douglas,
Arizona.15 Duran involved a civil rights suit brought to re-
cover for police activity culminating in the plaintiff's arrest
and physical injury.16 The primary interest in our context,
though, is the free speech issue involved.
In Duran, the police were sent to a hotel based on a bar-
tender's complaints about an "unruly" patron.' 7 Upon their
arrival, the police found the plaintiff "intoxicated and
threatening the bartender."' 8 After "a few heated words"' 9
between the plaintiff and one of the officers, the plaintiff was
escorted out of the bar and left the scene as a passenger in
an automobile driven by his wife. 20 Soon afterward, the
plaintiff passenger directed a number of obscene gestures
and oral profanities at one of the officers who had been dis-
patched to the bar.2' The arrest and injuries complained of
by plaintiff occurred shortly thereafter. 22
Writing for the court, Judge Alex Kozinski was critical of
the plaintiff's conduct.23 Recognizing, though, the imper-
missibility of basing an arrest at least in part on the arres-
tee's legitimate exercise of free speech rights, Judge
Kozinski considered whether the plaintiff's actions involved
speech in the constitutional sense. 24 Judge Kozinski de-
clared that "[t]he freedom of individuals to oppose or chal-
15 904 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1990).
16 See Duran, 904 F.2d at 1374-75.
17 Id. at 1374.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See id. at 1374-75.
22 See id. at 1375.
23 See id. at 1377.
24 See id. at 1377-78.
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lenge police action verbally without thereby risking arrest is
one important characteristic by which we distinguish our-
selves from a police state. '"25 With regard to the particular
instance before the court, Judge Kozinski concluded that
"[i]narticulate and crude as [the plaintiff's] conduct may
have been, it represented an expression of disapproval to-
ward a police officer with whom he had just had a run-in. As
such, it fell squarely within the protective umbrella of the
First Amendment."26
Few courts would disagree with Judge Kozinski's conclu-
sion in this regard. Yet if one actually applies the logic of
the broad range of values that might be thought to underlie
the free speech clause, the conclusion reached seems much
more problematic. Under such an approach, to amount to
speech in the constitutional sense, the plaintiff's language
and gestures must, at a minimum, meet one element of the
following disjunction: either the plaintiff's activity must be
countable as a contribution to our society's search for truth
in some relevant, sufficient sense, or as an act of participa-
tion in the process of democratic self-government, or as an
act of self-realization or self-development in a sense in
which such an aim would be suitably furthered by a distinc-
tive free speech clause. 27
Now, it is undeniable that the plaintiff's language and ges-
tures in Duran could fit any of these elements, if the element
or the distinctive free speech value chosen were stretched
with sufficient violence. Doubtless the plaintiff was expres-
sing some perhaps rather vague proposition he took to be
true, such as that the police officer's actions were worthy of
condemnation. In light of the "inarticulate"28 character of
the plaintiff's expression, it is difficult to say more.
There does not seem, for example, to be any broader or
public policy-implicative point or message to the plaintiff's
expression in Duran, of itself or in light of its context. This
is not to require that speech in the constitutional sense be
popular, plausible, or well-intended. Nor should we dis-
criminate against those of us who, for whatever reason, sim-
ply tend not to be terribly articulate. 29 But there is a
25 Id. at 1378.
26 Id.
27 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
28 Duran, 904 F.2d at 1378.
29 See R.G. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 18-19.
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generally detectable difference between the emotive adverse
reaction by an apparently intoxicated3o person to police in-
tervention on the one hand, and an angry, not terribly artic-
ulate protest of one's treatment by the police where one's
protest involves reference to some recognizable point or
idea with broader social content or implication. There is a
recognizable and constitutionally relevant difference be-
tween emotively objecting to being escorted out of a bar
and, say, objecting to being escorted away from a racially
segregated lunch counter.
The case for finding Duran's activities to involve speech in
the constitutional sense would therefore be strengthened 3'
if, for example, Duran's threats32 or other discourse with the
hotel bartender had involved some identifiable social pur-
port or content in a broad sense. The same could be said if
Duran's objections to his treatment by the police had in-
volved a sense of ethnic-based unfairness, or at least implicit
reference to an alleged pattern of official, or even societal,
discrimination. The appellate report of Duran provides no
clear indication that either of these possibilities obtained.
The absence of any such social content, or of the intent to
purvey or imply such social content, is important to the free
speech analysis in that it suggests that the free speech values
or purposes identified above 33 will not be distinctively pro-
moted by recognizing the activity in question as speech in
the constitutional sense. It is certainly conceivable that, on
the above factual assumptions, someone may still maintain
that Duran's activities significantly involved the ongoing so-
cietal quest for relevant truths, or amounted to democratic
participation in government, or distinctively implicated the
value of self-actualization or self-development in a relevant
sense. But in such a case, the fear naturally arises that
speech in the constitutional sense is thereby being ex-
panded to include general kinds of activities that are so re-
moved from the paradigmatic or plainly central kinds of
speech as to raise the question of why a society would want
to accord such kinds of activities the powerful constitutional
30 Duran, 904 F.2d at 1374.
31 For a discussion of how to resolve close cases of whether speech should, in
other free speech contexts, be considered as speech on a matter of public interest or
concern, see R.G. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 185-217.
32 Duran, 904 F.2d at 1374.
33 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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immunity from sacrifice for the general social good embod-
ied in the first amendment.3 4 If "few of us would march our
sons and daughters off to war ' '3 5 to protect a general kind of
putative speech, that may be not because most of us disa-
gree with the content of some particular message commonly
associated with that kind of speech, but because we realize
that the putative kind of speech's general failure to signifi-
cantly implicate the free speech values in an appropriately
robust sense means that the activity in question does not
qualify as speech in the constitutional sense.
This is not to suggest, of course, that whether a particular
activity counts as speech in the constitutional sense can inva-
riably be determined by considering only the general kind
or category of activity into which it falls. It may sometimes
be important to consider the particular context, circum-
stances, and intent. Confiscation of even a political treatise
arguably does not raise a free speech issue if the book has
no potential significance to any relevant person other than
as a paperweight or as a hiding place for paper money. On
the other hand, it is conceivable that even plate-balancing
on the end of a pole could, under some circumstances, con-
vey in a uniquely effective way some unmistakable political
message, such that prohibiting the act of plate-balancing be-
comes censorship and raises free speech issues. Against the
background of these general considerations, then, we may
turn to Judge Posner's analysis of the crucial free speech is-
sue in Miller.
II. JUDGE POSNER ON THE CLASSIFICATION
OF NUDE DANCING
As of the time of the en banc Seventh Circuit decision in
Miller, Judge Posner had established that "erotic discourse"
was at least in some instances susceptible of conveying a
message sufficient to implicate the free speech clause.36
More broadly, Judge Posner had observed from the bench 37
34 For a discussion of the nature and strength of constitutional protection of
speech, see Wright, Does Free Speech Juriprudence Rest on a Mistake?: Implications of the
Commensurability Debate, 23 Lov. L.A.L. REV. 763 (1990).
35 Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1985)(quoting
Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)).
36 See, e.g., Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1990).
37 It is certainly conceivable thatJudge Posner's academic or scholarly discussions
of free speech might represent his true or unconstrained views, while his opinions
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that "[t]he purpose of the free-speech clause ...is to pro-
tect the market in ideas, .. . broadly understood as the pub-
lic expression of ideas, narratives, concepts, imagery,
opinions-scientific, political, or aesthetic-to an audience
whom the speaker seeks to inform, edify, or entertain." 3
Judge Posner's concurring opinion in Miller, however, ex-
tends the scope of what is to count as speech, for free
speech purposes, beyond this point. Focusing not so much
on the plaintiff's activity itself as on the general category of
dance, clad or unclad, Judge Posner observes that " [d]ance
... is a medium of expression, of communication." 39 What
the dance is thought to express or communicate, however, is
not ideas4o but "emotion, or more precisely, an ordering of
sights and sounds that arouses emotion." 4 1
This naturally prompts the question whether every human
activity amounting to an ordering of sights and sounds cal-
culated to stimulate an emotional or, as in Miller, any kind of
glandular response counts as speech in the constitutional
sense. Judge Posner's analysis begins promisingly by distin-
guishing between two kinds of expression or expressive-
ness. 42 In a broad sense, angrily kicking one's wastebasket
in the absence of an audience expresses, discharges, or
manifests, one's anger.43 Expression in the narrower sense,
however, involves an interpersonal dimension. Posner dis-
tinguishes these two senses of expression on the basis that"the expression that is relevant to freedom of speech ... is
the expression of a thought, sensation, or emotion to another
person. "44
Crucially, though, this latter, narrower category of expres-
sion involving an audience is most definitely not, on Pos-
from the bench might represent what Judge Posner considered himself bound to
hold by virtue of, say, authoritative Supreme Court precedent. However, no role-
based conflict between the strictures of Posner as scholar and Posner as judge plays
any significant role in the discussion below.
38 Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 (7th Cir. 1990).
39 Miller, 904 F.2d at 1091 (Posner, J., concurring).
40 See id. at 1093 (Posner, J., concurring).
41 See id. at 1091 (Posner, J., concurring). Query whether one can meaningfully
appreciate a ballet without having an "emotional" reaction thereto. Query also
whether an ordering of sights and sounds is not at least equally well describable as
the means by which something is communicated, rather than that which is itself com-
municated. See infra note 61.
42 See Miller, 904 F.2d at 1092 (Posner, J., concurring).
43 See id. (Posner, J., concurring).
44 Id. (Posner, J., concurring)(emphasis in the original).
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ner's analysis, coextensive with speech in the constitutional
sense. As Judge Posner explicitly recognizes, there is much
expression in the narrower sense that is neither judicially
nor widely academically classified as speech for free speech
purposes. Posner's own example is "putting geraniums in a
window box." 45 And in his own recent case law, Judge Pos-
ner employs the interesting and controversial example of"casual chit-chat" between a citizen and a police officer.46
At least some nude sunbathing, 47 and perhaps a "fashion
statement" made by some wearers of earrings48 might also
fall into this category of expression not amounting to
speech in the constitutional sense. Additionally, the
Supreme Court recently has declined authoritatively to rec-
ognize ordinary social or recreational dancing as speech in
the constitutional sense.49
What Judge Posner's analysis does not offer is a way of
distinguishing instances of expression in his narrow sense
that do not count as speech from those that do. The
45 Id. (Posner, J., concurring). Again, if this activity is not inherently and invaria-
bly expressive in the narrow sense, it at least has that potential in particular cases.
And planting the geraniums in a V-shape in 1942 counts as speech in the first amend-
ment sense on anyone's analysis.
46 See Swank, 898 F.2d at 1250-51.
47 See South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608 (1 1th Cir.
1984)(public nudity for the sake of making a nudity-related statement not speech in
the constitutional sense unless combined with a constitutionally protected mode of
expression). Judge Posner refers to nude sunbathing generally as "nonexpressive,"
for unspecified reasons. See Miller, 904 F.2d at 1092 (Posner, J., concurring).
48 See Rathert v. Village of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 517 (7th Cir. 1990)("[N]or
could the district court find any suggestion by plaintiffs that they wear ear studs to
express political, social, economic, educational, religious or cultural viewpoint, or any
other expressive activity. Plaintiffs' justification for wearing the ear studs is merely that
they 'want to' and 'for fashion'." (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit's language
in Rathert seems to suggest either that a public activity could be expressive in Pos-
ner's narrower sense without being expressive in a third, even narrower sense requir-
ing the expression of something like an idea or point of view; or else that wearing the
ear studs on this occasion failed to rise to the level of expression in either of Posner's
senses, if no thought, sensation, or emotion was sought to be conveyed, or if the
wearing of the ear studs did not express any inner mental state on the part of the
wearers.
49 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). The Court in Stanglin
observed:
It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a
person undertakes - for example, walking down the street, or meeting
one's friends at a shopping mall - but such a kernel is not sufficient to
bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment. We think
the activity of these dance-hall patrons - coming together to engage in rec-
reational dancing - is not protected by the First Amendment.
id. at 1595.
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Supreme Court presumably understands the capacity for
social dance to publicly express to an appreciative audience
the thought, sensation, or emotion of a Whitmanesque de-
light in the corporeal. Nude sunbathing engaged in for the
purpose of publicly expressing the same message, or to
graphically protest the constraints of bourgeoise conven-
tion, poses a similar problem of classification that Judge
Posner only obscures by classifying nude sunbathing as"nonexpressive. "50
Of course, it is the task of a judge on any given occasion
to resolve a particular case, not to write a treatise or even to
resolve a general jurisprudential problem. But our confi-
dence in the correctness of Judge Posner's approach in
Miller would be substantially enhanced if Posner could offer
an account of what is generally missing in social dancing, or
even in at least some instances of public nude sunbathing,
that is present in the commercial nude dancing in Miller that
makes only the latter activity speech in the constitutional
sense. If there is a responsive, appreciative audience for all
these activities, and relevantly similar states of mind or in-
tention on the part of the putative "speakers," it is not easy
to see, for example, what difference the exchange of money
could possibly make.
Judge Posner at this point refers to the well-known Indi-
anapolis pornography ordinance case of American Booksellers'
Association v. Hudnut 51 on the theory that the logic of Hudnut
requires his analysis in Miller.52 It is difficult to see, how-
ever, how Hudnut disposes of the problem in Miller. The as-
sumption made by the City of Indianapolis in Hudnut seems
to have been that at least some pornography, written or pic-
torial, seeks to and does convey something like the broadly
social idea that women ought to be hierarchically
subordinated to men in the sexual realm, if not elsewhere.
While the relationship between pornography and the free
speech clause is doubtless controversial, 53 it is perfectly pos-
sible to grant that some instances of pornography seek to
50 See Miller, 904 F.2d at 1092.
51 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
52 See Miller, 904 F.2d at 1092.
53 See, e.g., MacKinnon, Pornography as Sex Discrimination, 4 L. & INEQUALITY 38
(1986); Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 461 (1986); Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J.
589.
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and do convey a damaging and deeply offensive, but clear
social idea, whether they should nevertheless be suppressed
or not, while still maintaining that ordinary commercial
nude dancing does not seek to or in fact convey any such
broadly social idea.54 If this distinction between certain
kinds of pornography and most nude dancing is tenable-
and it hardly seems intuitively absurd-then the Hudnut case
dictates neither Posner's analysis nor his result in Miller.
The conclusion seems inescapable that Judge Posner has
not provided a usable account of why certain sorts of activi-
ties should count as speech and others should not. Judge
Posner does articulate his misgivings, however, with respect
to certain accounts he finds unacceptable. Among the alter-
native accounts rejected by Posner would be the suggestion
that commercial barroom nude dancing typically does not
seek5 5 to convey an idea or opinion of the sort requisite to
invoking the free speech clause.56
On this score, Judge Posner concedes that at least the
nude dancing at issue in Miller cannot be said to involve the
expression of ideas or opinions in any constitutionally rele-
vant sense.57 But Posner believes that imposing a require-
ment that an activity convey, or seek to convey, an idea in
order to qualify as speech in the constitutional sense is
counterintuitive, or leads to unacceptable consequences.
Perhaps the essence of Posner's argument in this regard is
that making idea-conveyance a necessary and perhaps suffi-
cient condition for speech "would thrust outside the [first]
amendment's boundaries virtually all nonverbal art-except
the relatively small fraction that is didactic-and much liter-
ature as well."58
If we set aside Posner's dubious affirmative claim that
54 See Miller, 904 F.2d at 1091, 1093-96 (Posner, J., concurring).
55 Courts have recognized that speech in the constitutional sense must involve
some minimally sufficient intent or state of mind on the part of the speaker, whatever
state of mind or degree of creativity may exist on the part of some actual or potential
audience. The First Circuit has observed that "[a]n act not intended to be communi-
cative does not acquire the stature of First-Amendment-protected expression merely
because someone, upon learning of the act, might derive some message from it."
Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1988)(en
banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989).
56 For an extended general presentation of the kind of account rejected by Judge
Posner at this point, see R.G. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 1-31.
57 See Miller, 904 F.2d at 1093 (Posner, J., concurring).
58 Id. (Posner, J., concurring).
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nonverbal art essentially communicates emotions, or pro-
vokes an emotional response, this becomes an interesting
and powerful argument, to which no single response seems
adequate. Fortunately, the jurisprudential tradition of
pleading in the alternative is well-established. For the pre-
cise form of a dualistic response to Judge Posner's argu-
ment, we may turn to a lesser known tradition from moral
philosophy under which, it is said, every argument is, to put
the matter rather coarsely, ultimately of the form "Oh
yeah?" or else of the form "So what?" 59 We shall recur in
turn to both of these forms of argument.
The "Oh yeah?" response to Judge Posner's argument
cannot, admittedly, be fully decisive, if for no other reason
than that aesthetic theory is not so rigorous a discipline as to
preclude all but one approach.60 It does seem clear that
most art, and certainly most good art, does not convey or
seek to convey ideas in the same sense as does a political
tract or a mathematical or scientific treatise. Good art, cer-
tainly, is not an elaborately coded message. But it does not
seem unreasonable to say that nondidactic, nonverbal art
typically conveys ideas and even appeals to the intellect in
some sense, whether the audience experiences some emo-
tional reaction or not.6'
It does not seem, for example, to be merely a pun or a
crude equivocation to talk of musical ideas, perhaps revolu-
tionary or cliched. A composer might conclude that at a
particular point, C rather than the more obvious C sharp is
called for by a partially cognitive aesthetic sense of right-
59 For a brief exposition, see Sturgeon, What Difference Does It Make Whether Moral
Realism Is True?, 24 S.J. PHILOSOPHY 115, 115 & 136 n.l (Supp. 1986).
60 For one widely-recognized approach to the problem of "expression" in the aes-
thetic context, see R. WOLLHEIM, ON ART AND THE MIND 84-100 (1974). For other
compulsory cites of inconclusive import, see A. DANTO, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISEN-
FRANCHISEMENT OF ART (1986); J. DERRIDA, THE TRUTH IN PAINTING (G. Bennington
& I. McLeod trans. 1987).
61 See, e.g., Finnis, "Reason and Passion:" The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and
Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 232-33 (1967). Finnis quotes the Bloomsbury art
critic Clive Bell as arguing that "[b]efore we feel an aesthetic emotion for a combina-
tion of forms, do we not perceive intellectually the rightness and necessity of the
combination? If we do, it would explain the fact that passing rapidly through a room
we recognize a picture to be good, although we cannot say that it has provoked much
emotion." Id. at 237 n.98 (quoting C. BELL, ART 26 (1914)). For examples ofjudicial
recognition, explicitly or implicitly, of the concept of "artistic ideas," see Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 35 (1973); State v. Valdes, 552 So. 2d 1372, 1377 (La. Ct.
App. 1989); Piscopo v. Piscopo, 231 N.J. Super. 576, 555 A.2d 1190, 1191 (Ch. Div.
1988), aft'd, 232 N.J. Super. 559, 557 A.2d 1040 (App. Div. 1989).
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ness. Now, this is not to suggest that art is good insofar as it
exhibits this kind of cognitive quality, or that art should be
evaluated on this basis. But it does suggest that there is an
ideational component to much, if not all art that is entirely
separate from the programmatic or thematic ideas in a nar-
rower, more familiar sense that are embodied in some art.
If it can be said, for example, that the Beethoven Seventh
Symphony is an apotheosis of the dance, 62 or in some the-
matic sense "about" the dance in the latter, narrower sense
of ideas, this does not exhaust the levels in which the com-
position may be said to intentionally embody and express
musical ideas.
There are two obvious responses at this point. First, it
might be said that the sense in which, say, a Bach partita
expresses nonprogrammatic or nonthematic musical ideas
in the broader sense is irrelevant to what we are concerned
about in the realm of freedom of speech. Second, it might
be said that if the nonthematic Bach partita expresses ideas
in a constitutionally relevant sense, then so, inescapably,
does ordinary commercial nude dancing. Neither of these
responses seems unassailable, however, even if we eschew
any qualitative comparison of the work of Bach and of the
plaintiffs in Miller, and waive any claim that the former is
artistically higher or better than the latter.
The point of requiring the presence of broadly social
ideas, for free speech classification purposes, is or should be
to rule out as "speech" that which is merely and exhaus-
tively self-referential or which involves no pretense of cogni-
tive engagement or application. The musical ideas of Bach,
or of a lesser composer, are not ideas in the same sense as,
for example, the ideas of chemical or economic equilibrium,
but they have significant intention-expressing cognitive con-
tent and can be uncontroversially linked to the recognized
free speech value of promoting the development and fulfill-
ment of the speaker's own capacities in a narrow, rigorous
sense.63 In a word, Bach's thoughtful construction of a par-
tita tends to implicate the free speech value of Bach's self-
realization in a way to which the typical exercise of commer-
cial nude dancing does not even pretend.
62 See Kerman & Tyson, Beethoven, Ludwig van, in 2 NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF
MusIC AND MUSICIANS § 14, at 382 (S. Sadie ed. 1980).
63 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
1991]
CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW
It is possible to argue that distinguishing between Bach
and the plaintiffs in Miller in this regard reduces to snob-
bery, social class bias, or arbitrary valuation. As Judge Pos-
ner has noted elsewhere, we live in a relativistic age64 that
increasingly resists ascribing objectivity to anything resem-
bling an apparently invidious distinction. Beyond some
point, establishing the relevant differences between art of a
familiar sort and most commercial nude dancing becomes
inseparable from the broader problem of relativism and
subjectivism in adjudication, a problem unavoidably beyond
the scope of our present inquiry.65
To the extent it is ultimately insisted that the self-realiza-
tion achievable through composing or interpreting a Bach
partita and the state of the performer's mind ordinarily in-
volved in commercial nude dancing are of one and the same
kind, and that they also do not differ even in degree in a way
sufficient to ground a constitutional distinction, we are
forced to the second, or "So what?" form of response to
Judge Posner's concerns. The argument would then simply
be that declining to extend free speech protection to either
the Bach partita or to commercial nude dancing would not
in that respect be particularly calamitous.
Now, we should be prepared to stipulate to the cultural
value of the Bach partitas and similar non-programmatic,
nonthematic, nonverbal art. But it should be noticed that
on Judge Posner's own assumptions, the cultural contribu-
tion of the Bach partitas is not to the world of ideas. 66 Pre-
sumably, no regime intent on suppressing the Bach partitas
and similar works could therefore coherently do so because
of its dislike of the (nonexistent) ideas conveyed by such
works. As well, we must rule out of consideration any sup-
pression of any art where the governmental restriction could
64 R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 332 (1988). See
also Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 827 (1988); Posner, Rebut-
tal to Malloy, 24 VAL. U.L. REV. 183 (1990).
65 For some relevant considerations, see Wright, Legal Relativism and the Rehnquist
Court, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 73 (1991); Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism Founded
On Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417 (1986). For a brief exposition of the distinction
between self-realization in the sense utilized by writers such as Plato, Aristotle,
Hegel, and John Stuart Mill on the one hand, and self-realization as simply doing
whatever one cares to do on the other, see R.G. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 1-31.
66 Thus, it is counterintuitive that the Bach partitas may deserve less free speech
protection, or may deserve free speech protection less clearly, than a musically unin-
spired patriotic tune, only if we assume that musical value must dominate any other
source of value for free speech purposes.
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be said to violate any constitutional provision other than the
free speech clause. One might, for example, challenge gov-
ernment censorship of art on independent grounds, such as
the takings or equal protection clause. Our argument at this
point is certainly not that artists have no constitutional
rights at all.
Judge Posner is apparently prepared to make certain con-
cessions in the face of the "So what?" form of response.
Specifically, Posner recognizes that suppression of barroom
commercial nude dancing would not, in and of itself,
amount to a devastating blow to the practice of free
speech. 67 But Posner is concerned not so much with the
consequences of suppressing nude dancing in isolation, but
with the possibility of such suppression amounting to a first
step in a series of cumulatively more injurious acts of sup-
pression. Posner wishes to avoid a possible "first step on
the road back to the institutionalized puritanism of Crom-
well's reign-during which all theatrical performances, in-
cluding performances of Shakespeare's plays, were
prohibited ...."68 Posner has recently written elsewhere
that "[c]omstockery could break out anew at any time, for,
historically, censorship of the obscene has come in cycles
(early Christianity, Puritan, Victorian). '"69
This is an intriguing argument. One's immediate reaction
is to doubt that the suppression of Bach or Shakespeare by
government edict is particularly likely for the foreseeable fu-
ture, regardless of how we decide cases like Miller. As Judge
Posner himself writes, "[i]n the America of 1990 the project
of stamping out nude striptease dancing is quixotic."7o But
it would perhaps be a mistake to survey the contemporary
popular cultural scene and simply conclude that broad-
based governmental suppression of nonthematic, nonidea-
tional, nonpolitical, nonverbal art is unlikely, however far
removed the actual contemporary censorship cases may
seem from Shakespeare. The more interesting and less dis-
missive response to Posner's concern over future govern-
ment censorship of such nonthematic art would question
whether Posner's inclination to protect barroom nude danc-
67 See Miller, 904 F.2d at 1098 (Posner, J., concurring).
68 Id.
69 R. POSNER, supra note 64, at 329-30.
70 Miller, 904 F.2d at 1104 (Posner, J., concurring).
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ing as speech is actually the approach best calculated to
avoid or discourage any eventual broad artistic censorship.
It seems to be widely agreed that over the past half cen-
tury or so, the line demarcating the obscene, the shocking,
and the immodest has generally drifted steadily toward
greater extremity, at least in the subject matter areas of
most direct concern in Miller.71 The logic of continually
pressing the frontier of what counts as protected speech, or
of what counts as speech in the first place, seems to borrow
from the military strategy of ensuring that one's battles are
fought over turf far removed from one's most valuable terri-
tory. The basic assumption seems to be that as long as the
debate remains focused on tangential concerns, such as the
status of commercial nude dancing, areas of more substan-
tial and central concern remain safe from attack.
It is of course impossible to convincingly demonstrate in
advance that this strategy for avoiding either a cataclysmic
lurch or a gradual progression toward a highly restrictive
free speech jurisprudence is unsound. We should at least
recognize the possibility of its backfiring, however. By way
of loose historical analogy, there may be no sufficient motive
for a Thermidorian reaction in the absence of the excesses
of the Terror.7 2 This is not to suggest that there is some
sort of inexorable Newtonian mechanism at work under
which perpetual expansion of the scope and protection of
the free speech clause eventually provokes a movement to
an equal and opposite jurisprudential extreme. But it is
plausible to argue that the cumulative result in cases such as
Miller tends, in the minds of many ordinary citizens, ulti-
mately to desanctify, if not to trivialize, the free speech
clause. There are many persons who would be prepared to
sacrifice mightily for the sake of a universal right to proclaim
a distasteful ideology. Few of us, however, would be in-
clined to make a similar sacrifice for the sake of the full
range of the speech potentialities of ordinary barroom nude
dancing, regardless of our differences as to the moral value
71 See id. at 1091 (Posner, J., concurring) ("Thirty years ago a striptease that ended
in complete nudity would have been thought obscene. No more."). Cf. id. at 1124
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting)(observing how the arguments reductio ad absurdum pro-
pounded by Justices Douglas and Black in 1957 on public nudity and the scope of the
free speech clause are now viewed as leading not to absurd, but to perfectly sound,
conclusions).
72 See C. BRINrON, ANATOMY OF REVOLtrrIoN (rev. ed. 1965).
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and the consequences of such activity. 73 If the scope of the
free speech clause is extended beyond a certain point, the
main effect of further extension is not to lead us to revere
the newly protected activity through its association with un-
controversially protection-worthy activities, but to tend to
bring the free speech clause into disrepute, at least beyond
certain minimal bounds, as just a jurisprudential vehicle for
constitutionally enshrining a sort of generalized libertarian-
ism. If, in our society, King Lear is ever to be suppressed-as
opposed to dying from public neglect-one suspects that
such suppression will stem not from drawing distinctions
between barroom nude dancing and King Lear, but from ju-
dicially classifying them together.
Now, it is easy to argue that the probability is low that the
next jurisprudential embrace of nude dancing, or nude sun-
bathing, or geranium repotting, as a form of speech, how-
ever neutrally regulable, will eventually prompt a collapse in
the free speech market. But it is just as easy to argue that
the court's deciding against the plaintiffs in Miller would not
have led inexorably to a regime of artistic thought control.
Few better statements of this point exist than Posner's own
scholarly analysis, published in 1986, of several of the
Supreme Court's recent free speech cases. At that time,
Posner argued that
It is hard to believe that if any or all of these cases had been
decided the other way, the marketplace of ideas would have
been noticeably impaired, or that judicial opinions could not
have been written distinguishing these cases from those where
suppression would impair that marketplace. The only justifi-
cation for these decisions is a fear . .. that if the Supreme
Court opened the door only a crack, the door would quickly
be blasted off its hinges. Yet a glance around the world will
show that most countries whose political and social institu-
tions are comparable to ours have a thriving marketplace of
ideas .... even though they do not have judicially enforceable
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press.74
73 Cf Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)(making a
similar point with respect to the cinematic medium).
74 Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1, 46 (1986).
Posner had previously observed that "when the domain of what is prohibited is nar-
rowly limited - to hard core pornography, or to live public displays of nudity as in
topless dancing - close substitutes for the prohibited matter remain, so that the net
diminution in private (and social) benefits is small." Id. at 44-45.
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It is irrelevant to this point that Judge Posner may now care
more than he did in 1986 about the marketplace of emo-
tions or feelings, as distinct from the marketplace of ideas.
A point comparable to that made by Posner regarding the
marketplace of ideas could just as easily be made about
emotions or feelings as well. Even if one insists that it is
precisely, and exclusively, "emotions" or "feelings" that are
conveyed from the mind of the nonthematic artist to the
mind of the audience, no horrifying long-term conse-
quences would have been reasonably anticipable had Miller
been decided the other way.
There is, on the other hand, some reason to fear that con-
tinuous expansion of the scope of the free speech clause
may result eventually in a reduction in the average level or
degree of constitutional protection accorded to that which is
classified as speech. There would be a certain pragmatic
logic to such a jurisprudential development, however unan-
ticipated. It would of course be going too far to suggest that
when the free speech clause becomes a mile wide in scope,
it will become an inch deep in protection. But there is some
logic to the view that something roughly akin to this attenu-
ation process has already begun in the area of the free exer-
cise of religion. The recent, apparently dramatic
curtailment of free exercise rights under Employment Division
v. Smith 75 may have been largely unexpected, but, after the
fact, some such curtailment seems perfectly understandable
in light of the frequent judicial unwillingness or inability to
impose limits on what counts for legal purposes as a sin-
cerely held religious belief or practice. 76 The more that
counts as sincere religious belief, the less special such a gen-
eral category inevitably becomes, and the greater the rela-
tive weight we begin to ascribe to competing values and
competing considerations; hence, the less protection such
belief or practice in general comes to receive.
Obviously, this partial explanation of Smith is speculative
at best. But it is plausible enough to suggest, by analogy,
that the judicial project, endorsed by Judge Posner in Miller,
75 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
76 Cf. Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1988)(reversing the trial
court's finding of religious insincerity based on the often difficult distinction between
insincerity and repeated instances of "backsliding" or weakness of will). See also Fra-
zee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 409 U.S. 829, 833 (1989)(free exercise of
religion claims need not be based on the mandates of an organized religious group).
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of continually expanding the scope of the free speech clause
may involve important risks and costs in terms of the values
underlying the free speech clause itself. This would not be a
progressive, genuinely liberating development. It may be
that necessity will dictate certain modifications of our free
speech jurisprudence in order to accommodate increasingly
prominent relativist, subjectivist, and post-literate, if not
post-verbal elements within our culture. The free speech ju-
risprudence of Judge Posner's opinion in Miller may tend to
jeopardize, over the long term, important values that are
still widely shared.

